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“No Good Reason for the Government to Interfere”: 
Business, the State, and Railway Employee Safety in 
Britain, circa 1900–1939 
Mike Esbester 
I examine the business-state relationship in occupational safety on 
Britain’s railways between approximately 1900 and 1939.  Before 
1914, I argue, occupational safety attracted significant state 
interest.  Railway companies neutralized threatened government 
“interference” by constructing clearly defined roles for each party.  
Companies did not simply oppose state action, but used a 
combination of stalling, apparent cooperation, and a subtle 
discrediting of state “knowledge” to minimize the impact of state 
intervention upon managerial autonomy.  The 1913 "Safety First" 
campaign was a preemptory response to threatened legislation 
and a clear instance of the influence of the regulatory environment 
over the decision-making process within enterprise.  I explain the 
lack of government intervention in safety issues after 1914 in terms 
of wider political and economic developments in the British 
railway industry.  Continuities across the period, and the 
companies’ and the state’s shared similar understandings of 
safety, predisposed the state acceptance of companies’ claims that 
they could regulate employee safety without state involvement.  I 
demonstrate the importance of state-business interaction in 
responses to dangerous work environments. 
 
On February 15 2004, four workers were run over and killed while 
maintaining railway lines in Northeast England.  This incident was a 
sudden and visible reminder of the potential dangers faced by those who 
work on the railways.  While such deaths are remarkable today, a hundred 
years ago they were unexceptional.  The continued incidence of death and 
injury over the intervening years demonstrates that throughout its 
existence, the railway industry has faced one unceasing challenge: how to 
reconcile the demands of production with the demands of employee safety. 
This challenge is the essence of my paper.  I will explore some of the 
ways in which business and the state interacted to construct worker safety 
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on the railways of Britain between approximately 1900 and 1939.  For the 
sake of clarity, the term “state” is used to indicate the institutions of 
national government within Britain, including the governing party, 
Parliament, and the associated regulatory bodies.  I begin with a brief 
outline of state involvement in railway employee safety in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, highlighting the exceptional degree of action 
between 1900 and 1914.  I then explain how the companies dealt with 
external intervention before 1900, arguing that fundamental changes in 
the railway industry in the late nineteenth century resulted in the 
increased state interest in employee safety.  A 1914 statement epitomizes 
the railway companies’ strategies to minimize state intervention after 
1900: there was “no good reason for the government to interfere.”1  These 
strategies culminated in 1913 with the introduction of the “Safety 
Movement,” an industry-produced safety campaign.  I argue, with respect 
to the lack of state intervention in employee safety after 1914, that the state 
accepted the “Safety Movement” as the means of improving employee 
casualty rates.  State acceptance of the “Safety Movement” came about 
because of the strength of interest and the similarity of outlook between 
the regulators and the railway companies.2 
Although the interaction between politics and the railway industry in 
Britain has been relatively well researched, staff safety has received less 
attention.3  This is partly a result of the apparent lack of attention devoted 
to the subject at the state level.  Between 1825 and 1893 there was no 
legislation specifically concerning employee safety.4  Between 1893 and 
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1 The Railway Engineer (June 1914), 169. 
2 Mike Esbester, “ ‘Dead on the Point of Safety’:  Occupational Safety Education 
on the Great Western Railway, 1913-1939”  (Ph.D. diss. in progress, University of 
York, U.K). 
3 Gourvish has identified strong government control as a distinguishing feature of 
the history of railways in Britain.  Terry Gourvish, British Railways, 1948-73: A 
Business History (Cambridge, U.K., 1986), 567; Gourvish, “The Regulation of 
Britain’s Railways,” in Transport Regulation Matters, ed. James McConville 
(London, 1997), 3-15, at 3.  See also Henry Parris, Government and the Railways 
in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1965); Geoffrey Alderman, The Railway 
Interest (Leicester, U.K., 1973).  Ewan Knox’s “Blood on the Tracks: Railway 
Employers and Safety in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain,” Historical 
Studies in Industrial Relations 12 (Autumn 2001): 1-26, is the only significant 
study concentrating solely on employee safety. 
4 Employees were theoretically included within the limited powers of the 1840 
Railway Regulation Act (“An Act for Regulating Railways,” 3 and 4 Victoria, 1840, 
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1898, the state took some limited action, regulating working hours and 
appointing two inspectors to investigate employee casualties.5 
State intervention increased dramatically after 1898.  The Railway 
Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act was passed in 1900.6  This act 
gave the state supervisory body, the Railway Department of the Board of 
Trade, the power “to make general rules, or to give specific orders in the 
interests of safety.”7  Rules ordering the use of various mechanical 
                                                                                                                                           
chap. 97), which demanded that companies return figures of incidents “attended 
with personal injuries” (Railway Regulation Act, 1840, Section III).  In practice, 
however, some companies failed to make any returns; see Peter Bartrip and 
Sandra Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial Compensation 
Policy, 1833-1897 (Oxford, U.K., 1983), 40.  Those companies that did provide 
returns appear to have considered that their obligation extended only as far as 
passengers.  The Regulation of Railways Act of 1871 attempted to compel the 
companies to include figures of employee death and injury in the returns (“An Act 
to Amend the Law Respecting the Inspection and Regulation of Railways,” 34 and 
35 Victoria, 1871, chap. 78, Section 6).  The Royal Commission that sat between 
1874 and 1877 (Report from the Commissioners on Railway Accidents, [London, 
1877]) also spent some time considering the safety of employees, although the 
majority of their attention was devoted to passenger safety, which was the stated 
reason for the formation of the Commission.  See Phillip Bagwell, The Transport 
Revolution from 1770 (London, 1974), 192. 
5 Although Members of Parliament sympathetic to railway trades unions 
promoted the 1893 Railway Regulation Act, it was couched in terms of passenger 
safety; see “An Act to amend the Law with respect to the Hours of Labour of 
Railway Servants,” 56 and 57 Victoria, 1893, chap. 29.  On the inspectors 
appointed to inquire into employee casualties, see Pete Houghton, “The 
Emergence of the Employment Inspectors in the Railway Inspectorate, c.1890-
1914” (M.A. thesis, Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History, University 
of York, 2004). 
6 “An Act for the better Prevention of Accidents on Railways,” 63 and 64 Victoria, 
1900, chap. 27.  Short title: Railway Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act, 
1900. 
7 Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Causes of 
Accidents, Fatal and Non-Fatal, to Servants of Railway Companies and of 
Truck Owners (Cd. 41, London, 1900), 13.  This role was not taken on lightly, and 
debate continued on the “appropriate” degree of state power and about whether 
the state assumed some measure of responsibility for casualties with these 
powers.  In evidence to the 1899 Royal Commission, Colonel Sir Francis 
Marindin of the Railway Department viewed additional powers as removing 
responsibility from the companies, where it ought to lie.  Royal Commission on 
the Causes of Accidents, Fatal and Non-Fatal, to Servants of Railway Companies 
and of Truck Owners, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (Cd. 42, London, 
1900), Q. 2438.  Usselman has observed similar debates in the United States: 
Steven Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and 
Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York, 2002), 315-26.  Bernstein considers 
that regulatory commissions have, as a result of hostility from the regulatee, 
tended “to define their goals in extremely limited terms and to be hesitant in 
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improvements in railway work were passed in 1902 and 1911.8  In order to 
test life-saving appliances, the Railway Employment Safety Appliances 
Committee was created in 1906, consisting of one representative from the 
Railway Department and one each from the trades unions and the railway 
companies.9  Finally, in May 1914 a Departmental Committee was 
appointed to investigate the necessity for further legislation on employee 
safety, although the committee never reported, because the First World 
War intervened.10  It is evident that the state was very active between 1900 
and 1914, at least at an administrative level.11 
After 1914, state intervention decreased. No additional measures were 
enacted specifically to address railway employee safety.12  As Barbara 
Hutter notes, “the regulation of occupational health and safety on the 
railways did not develop substantially from its nineteenth-century roots 
until the 1960s.”13  It can be seen, then, that the period between 1900 and 
1914 was exceptional in its level of state activity.  What produced this 
fifteen-year period of intense action, given the dearth of intervention 
before 1900 and after 1914? 
                                                                                                                                           
upsetting traditional ways of doing business.”  Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating 
Business by Independent Commission (Princeton, N.J., 1955), 14. 
8 Prevention of Accidents Rules 1902; Prevention of Accidents Rules 1911. 
9 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) MT 45/8, 
file relating to the Railway Employment Safety Appliances Committee (RESAC). 
The RESAC was appointed under the conditions of the 1900 Act. Railway 
Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act, 1900, Section 15. 
10 For example, see The Railway Engineer (June 1914), 169; Railway Gazette (12 
June 1914), 779.  In addition, throughout this period Railway Department 
inspectors examined dangerous sites, held inquiries into casualties, and made 
recommendations for improvements. 
11 The issue of policy implementation is beyond the remit of this paper; it is 
sufficient to note here that practice could differ significantly from prescription.  
The close relationship between state and companies was likely to have affected 
implementation in practice. 
12 The Factories Act, 1937, affected those employees in the workshops covered by 
the Factories legislation; the intent of introducing this legislation, however, was 
not to address railway employee safety specifically.  It was also subject to 
extensive resistance by factory and manufacturing employers, including the 
railway companies.  See Arthur McIvor, “Industrial Relations in Britain, 1900-
1939,” in A Companion to Early Twentieth Century Britain, ed. Chris Wrigley 
(Oxford, U.K., 2003), 330; Helen Jones, “The Home Office and Working 
Conditions 1914 to 1940” (Ph.D. diss., London University, 1983), 188. 
13 Barbara Hutter, Regulation and Risk: Occupational Health and Safety on the 
Railways (Oxford, U.K., 2001), 35.  Having devoted nine pages to the develop-
ment of occupational safety on the railways in the nineteenth century, Hutter 
gives the period between 1900 and 1974 (the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act) 
just two pages, and 1900-1939 receives a scant two sentences.  Hutter, 
Regulation and Risk, 27-37. 
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Central to explaining the lack of state activity before 1900 is the 
companies’ ability to deflect state interest.  The companies used a variety 
of techniques to protect their autonomy from external intervention.  The 
strength of company representation in Parliament ensured the opposition 
or neutralization of legislative proposals.14  Threat of increased state 
intervention was answered with the claim that the companies would 
introduce the necessary remedies voluntarily.15  The British companies’ 
refusal to recognize trades unions also ensured that a potential source of 
agitation for improved employee safety was suppressed.16  Finally, Rande 
Kostal has argued that legal decisions effectively excluded employees from 
claiming compensation for injury.  As in the United States, these decisions 
removed the companies’ financial incentive to improve employee safety.17 
                                                   
14 On the companies’ success in opposing state intervention, see Knox, “Blood on 
the Tracks,” 12-13; Alderman, The Railway Interest; Phillip Bagwell, “The 
Railway Interest: Its Organisation and Influence, 1839-1914,” Journal of 
Transport History, 1st ser., 7 (Nov. 1965): 65-86; Parris, Government and the 
Railways. 
15 The idea of the “voluntary solution” was not restricted to the railways: it found 
ready acceptance within a prevailing political ethos that favored a relatively 
limited degree of state intervention.  With reference to passenger safety, the 
companies protested their ability to introduce safeguards such as continuous 
brakes voluntarily, and the state acquiesced until the Armagh crash of 1889, in 
which 78 people died and 260 were injured.  Three months later, an Act of 
Parliament forced companies to introduce continuous brakes and other measures 
for the protection of passengers.  Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, 192-93.  
Indeed, the claim of voluntary action was sufficiently convincing to last well into 
the twentieth century, as seen in the prevalence of the “Safety Movement.”  The 
“voluntary solution” also had purchase in the United States: Kurt Wetzel, 
“Railroad Management’s Response to Operating Employees Accidents, 1890-
1913,” Labor History 21 (1980): 351-68, quotation at 354. 
16 Geoffrey Alderman, “The Railway Companies and the Growth of Trade 
Unionism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Historical 
Journal 14 (March 1971): 129-52; Phillip Bagwell, The Railwaymen: The History 
of the National Union of Railwaymen (London, 1963), esp. 297-99. 
17 Rande Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 1825-1875 (Oxford, U.K., 
1994), esp. 254-321; Elisabeth Cawthon, Job Accidents and the Law in England’s 
Early Railway Age: Origins of Employer Liability and Workmen’s Compensa-
tion (Lampeter, Wales, 1997).  As in the United States, the doctrines of 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and common employment were 
utilized; the view was that employees would act more carefully, as they knew that 
they would not receive compensation in the event of injury.  As with the 
understandings of casualty causation that shaped the trajectory of the “Safety 
Movement,” this body of legal decisions was rooted in the notion that it was 
necessary to change employee behavior rather than the system of operation that 
put employees into potentially dangerous situations.  On the American 
experience, see Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business 
History in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939 (Baltimore, Md., 
1997), 5, 29-30; Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 290-91; Jonathan 
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However, the success of those strategies diminished notably after 
approximately 1890.18  What had changed?  State activity had gradually 
increased across many facets of society during the nineteenth century.19  
This included the railway industry and, by 1900, the companies’ freedom 
was heavily curtailed.20  The number of company representatives in 
                                                                                                                                           
Simon, “For the Government of its Servants: Law and Disciplinary Power in the 
Work Place, 1870-1906,” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 13 (1993): 105-36; 
Nan Goodman, Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and the Theory of Accidents 
in Nineteenth Century America (London, 1998). 
18 While the outward success of the companies in deflecting state attention to 
employee safety before approximately 1900 was manifested in the lack of 
legislative intervention, there were underlying tensions promoted by the 
companies’ tactics (particularly non-recognition of the unions) that resulted in 
increasing external pressure after 1900.  Company opposition effectively forced 
the unions to seek redress through political channels, using sympathetic MPs, 
their own MPs, and by lobbying the Board of Trade (after 1919, the Ministry of 
Transport).  This increased the public prominence of what the companies 
understood as a “business” matter.  This is a very limited adaptation of the 
argument made by Alborn, who provides an important qualification to the 
railway companies’ apparent success in resisting external intervention before the 
1890s.  With particular reference to railway rates, he argues that short-term 
successes were achieved at the expense of long-term viability.  Consequently, 
from the end of the nineteenth century the companies were subject to increasing 
external regulation (through the state apparatus and through public pressure) 
that they were unable to resist.  See Timothy Alborn, Conceiving Companies: 
Joint-Stock Politics in Victorian England (London, 1998), 173-256. 
19 For example, Oliver MacDonagh, “The Nineteenth Century Revolution in 
Government: A Reappraisal,” Historical Journal 1 (1958): 52-67; James Roy 
Hay, The Development of the British Welfare State, 1880-1975 (London, 1978); 
Peter Bartrip, “State Intervention in Mid-Nineteenth Century Britain: Fact or 
Fiction?” Journal of British Studies 23 (Autumn 1983): 63-83; John Armstrong 
and David Williams, “The Steamboat, Safety and the State: Government Reaction 
to New Technology in a Period of Laissez-Faire,” The Mariner’s Mirror 89 (May 
2003): 167-84; John Armstrong, “Government Regulation in the British Shipping 
Industry, 1830-1913: The Role of the Coastal Sector,” in Institutions in the 
Transport and Communications Industries: State and Private Actors in the 
Making of Institutional Patterns, 1850-1990, ed. Lena Andersson-Skog and Olle 
Krantz (Canton, Mass., 1999), 153-71; Eric Evans, Social Policy 1830-1914: 
Individualism, Collectivism and the Origins of the Welfare State (London, 1978); 
William Howard Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, vol. 1: The Rise of 
Collectivism (London, 1983). 
20 Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 13; Terry Gourvish, “The Regulation of Britain’s 
Railways: Past, Present and Future,” in Institutions in the Transport and 
Communications Industries, ed. Andersson-Skog and Krantz, 117-32; Frank 
Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the 
Railway Age (Cambridge, U.K., 1994); Parris, Government and the Railways.  
The railway companies certainly recognized the period after 1900 as one in which 
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Parliament declined, while there was a simultaneous increase in labor 
representation, consequently reducing the companies’ ability to resist 
political pressure.21  The growth in trade unionism resulted in increased 
pressure on the companies after 1895.22  Public interest in employee safety 
also increased before 1900, prompted in part by the unions and in part by 
the huge number of casualties; in 1899 alone over 16,000 employees were 
either killed or injured.23 
With a state-imposed cap on fares after 1894, increasing operational 
costs, and decreasing profitability, the companies’ room to maneuver 
diminished.24  As in the United States, labor relations were crucial, 
especially given the new practices focused on the increasing intensity and 
speed of work.25  Legal decisions that had denied employees compensation 
                                                                                                                                           
they were subject to intense pressure from external forces.  For example, in 1910 
the Great Western Railway (London) Lecture and Debating Society was told that 
of recent years the management and conduct of Railways have been 
subjected to all sorts of criticism and attack, ranging from the 
uninformed, though highly imaginative, vaporings of the cheaper kind of 
Press, to the concerted action of various important trading interests, and 
even at times, to what railwaymen mostly consider the unnecessary, if not 
unwarranted, interference on the part of Government Authorities. 
  See F. P. Larkin, “The Business Value of Departmental Co-operation on 
Railways,” Great Western Railway [GWR] Lecture and Debating Society, London, 
14 Dec. 1910. 
21 Bagwell, “The Railway Interest,” 81-83. 
22 Detailed consideration of the involvement of the unions is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but it seems to have been a significant factor in prompting concern 
over employee safety in Parliament and in the wider public.  On the growing 
power of railway trade unions, see David Howell, Respectable Radicals: Studies 
in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism (Aldershot, U.K., 1999); Alderman, 
“The Railway Companies,” 129-52; Bagwell, “The Railway Interest,” 81-83. 
23 Killed: 582; injured: 15,584; total: 16,166.  Figures from General Report to the 
Board of Trade upon the Accidents that have occurred on the Railways of the 
United Kingdom for the Year 1899 (Cd. 320, London, 1900), 3.  [All Board of 
Trade/ Ministry of Transport Reports viewed at the National Railway Museum 
(NRM), York, England.]  The available statistics on employee death and injury 
are highly problematic.  There is no guarantee that all injuries were reported; the 
increases caused by the tightening definition of “accident” in 1895 and 1906 
indicate that, prior to those dates, some work-related injuries went unrecorded.  
Also, the split authority for investigating and reporting casualties complicated 
figures: while the companies reported “outside” casualties to the Board of Trade 
(that is, casualties involving trains or work on the lines), factory casualties were 
reported to the Home Office.  See also the comments of Knox, “Blood on the 
Tracks,” 5-8. 
24 Robert Irving, “The Profitability and Performance of British Railways, 1870-
1914,” Economic History Review 31 (Feb. 1978): 46-66; Alderman, “The Railway 
Companies,” 132-33; Howell, Respectable Radicals, 28. 
25 Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 12, 285-87; Howell, Respectable 
Radicals, 47, 75; TNA: PRO RAIL 1124/175, Minutes of Proceedings of the 
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for injury were overturned, until compensation became automatic in 1897.  
This imposed a financial burden that the companies had not previously 
faced; one company paid out just under £32,000 in 1913 alone, equivalent 
to about £2.1 million at 2005 prices.26  The similarity to the United States 
is striking; in both countries a variety of political, economic, and social 
factors came together to reduce the available means for companies to 
address employee safety.  At the same time, the pressures on the state to 
intervene increased.27  Consequently, as noted, the state took the more 
active role in regulating railway employee safety after 1899. 
So how did the companies respond to the increased state intervention, 
which was understood as “interference” and an assault upon managerial 
prerogative?28  They used a variety of techniques intended to minimize the 
impact of state action. 
                                                                                                                                           
Departmental Committee appointed to Inquire into the Working of the Railway 
Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act, 1900, and to Report what 
Amendments, if any, are necessary (unpublished minutes, London, printed 
1914) [hereafter Departmental Committee—QQ], 364-71, testimony of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pelham von Donop (Chief Inspecting Officer, Railway 
Department, Board of Trade); Q. 1235, testimony of Jimmy Thomas (Assistant 
Secretary, National Union of Railwaymen); QQ. 2530-34, testimony of John 
Langford Hill (Goods Staff, GWR). 
26 By way of comparison, passenger compensation on the GWR (for casualty 
rather than lost baggage) for 1913 came to just over £5,100 (1913 prices).  TNA: 
PRO RAIL 1110/196, GWR Half-Yearly Reports and Accounts 1913-1922, 
Accounts for Year Ended 31 December 1913, 11.  Equivalent price in 2005 based 
on the Retail Price Index.  Lawrence Officer, “How much is that worth today?,” 
2004, Economic History Services; viewed 2 May 2006.  URL: http://eh.net/ 
hmit/ppowerbp/.  Prior to 1913 figures given in the accounts were not 
disaggregated; in 1898, the final complete year prior to the effect of the 1897 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, total passenger and employee compensation 
came to just under £8,600 (1898 prices). 
27 On the similarities with American railroads, see Wetzel, “Railroad 
Management’s Response,” 351, 357, 365; Charles Clark, “The Railroad Safety 
Problem in the United States, 1900-1930,” Transport History 8 (Spring 1977): 
54-74, at 63; Aldrich, Safety First, 169, 188; Usselman, Regulating Railroad 
Innovation, 290-92. 
28 For example, Frank Potter, the chief assistant to the general manager of the 
GWR, stated, “State control destroys that free exercise of discretion which is 
essential to secure the best commercial results.”  Report of lecture given by Frank 
Potter, “The Requirements of the Board of Trade,” Great Western Railway 
Magazine [GWRM] (Jan. 1905), 12.  On ideas of interference, see Hutter, 
Regulation and Risk, 34; Alderman, The Railway Interest, 44, 135; Bartrip and 
Burman, The Wounded Soldiers, 41-42.  The idea of state intervention as 
“interference” was not confined to the railways; see Arthur McIvor, “State 
Intervention and Work Intensification: The Politics of Occupational Health and 
Safety in the British Cotton Industry, c.1880-1914,” in Labour, Social Policy and 
the Welfare State, ed. Ad Knotter, Bert Altena, and Dirk Damsma (Amsterdam, 
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Chief among these was what Ewan Knox calls “regulatory bargaining” 
with the Board of Trade and Parliament, by which the companies 
persuaded the state that they would co-operate willingly, making “harsh” 
legislation unnecessary.  In this, the companies were successful; the 1900 
act was a much-revised version of the original bill, which the companies 
found highly objectionable.29  The companies were willing participants on 
the Railway Employment Safety Appliances Committee, a committee that 
appeased union demands for further action but that, with a deft stroke by 
the companies, was steered away from considering any appliances that 
would be too costly to introduce.30  One union noted that “The [safety] 
agitation weakened upon the appointment of a Committee of Safety by the 
Board of Trade, and if the intention . . . was to smother the agitation . . . 
they have largely succeeded.”31  In working with the state, the companies 
were able to deflect attention from those issues that they did not want 
examined. 
While cooperating on the one hand, the companies stalled on the other.  
The need for changes in brakes on railway wagons was first recognized in 
1900, yet sustained objection over the form these changes should take 
meant that rules were not introduced until 1911.32  The unions protested 
                                                                                                                                           
1997), 129; John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine 
Safety (Albany, N.Y., 1985), 98. 
29 Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 11-12, 14, 19-22.  See also, Alderman, The 
Railway Interest, 59, 175; Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 326. 
30 The RESAC considered the question of automatic couplings between wagons 
from its inception, an innovation that the railway companies had opposed since 
the 1890s on the grounds of cost.  However, after six meetings, the Committee’s 
third report effectively disbarred the subject from further consideration: “After 
very full consideration of the subject it was decided that as far as automatic 
couplers were concerned, it appeared to be impracticable to fit appliances of such 
a character to existing waggon [sic] stock and consequently any extensive tests of 
automatic couplers under present conditions would be of no value.”  In the Third 
Report of the RESAC to the Railway Department, Board of Trade, 20 Dec. 1907, 
2.  Although difficult to prove conclusively, it seems likely that the actions of the 
companies and the similarity of views between the companies and the Railway 
Department prompted this conclusion. 
31 Railway Review (26 April 1912), 1. 
32 Railway Employment (Prevention of Accidents) Act, 1900, schedule, item no. 1; 
GWRM (Dec. 1907), 258; GWRM (May 1908), 96; GWRM (Jan. 1909), 2; 
Railway Gazette (3 March 1911), 218; Railway Gazette (20 Oct. 1911), 412-15; 
GWRM (Dec. 1911), 329-30.  Even the rules passed in 1911 allowed the companies 
up to twenty years to enact their provisions.  Different timescales were given for 
conversion of appliances in proportion to the size of the vehicles that needed 
changing, up to a maximum of twenty years for those with over 20,000 vehicles.  
The stalling continued beyond 1911, however, with the companies successfully 
applying for extensions to the length of the period allowed for brake installation 
until suspension of the Rules at the outbreak of war in 1939.  Wetzel notes that 
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about this stalling in 1914: “I desire to draw attention to the delay which 
has taken place by the Board of Trade in the making of . . . rules.”33  Much 
of this delay was legitimated by the companies on the premise of the 
voluntary adoption of safety measures.  For example, in 1899 the 
companies believed that “no case for immediate legislation has been made 
out, and that time should be given for voluntary effort on the part of the 
Railway Companies.”34  Stalling and voluntary compliance—within the 
companies’ own timescale—thereby became a means of reclaiming some 
degree of control from the state.35 
The most significant attempt to assert company control during this 
period came in the contest over who had the right to define “knowledge.”  
The companies used a variety of means to question the Board of Trade.36  
It was claimed that the Board of Trade’s demands “were not always wise or 
practicable,” to the extent that “we cannot help questioning whether. . . 
[the Board] is as well advised as it might be, especially upon matters of a 
practical . . . character affecting railways.”37  There was continuous 
pressure on the boundaries of state regulation, with claims that only the 
companies had the authority to judge and solve the employee safety 
problem.38  In 1911, for example, the Great Western Railway claimed, “the 
                                                                                                                                           
the American railroads deployed the same tactics following the 1893 Safety 
Appliances Act.  See Wetzel, “Railroad Management’s Response,” 353-54. 
33 TNA: PRO RAIL 1124/175, Departmental Committee, Q. 1288, testimony of 
Jimmy Thomas.  See also, Q. 1084, and the report in the Railway Gazette (17 
July 1914), 105. 
34 TNA: PRO RAIL 1098/3, Railway Companies Association (RCA) meeting no. 
380, minute 2307, 12 July 1899.  This voluntary ethos was deliberately reinforced 
in 1914, when the GWR noted the industry’s success in taking dead-buffered 
wagons (those without sprung buffers, the shock absorbers between wagons) out 
of service.  Yet, even this triumphalist rhetoric contained an acknowledgement of 
a three-year delay in implementing the change.  See GWRM (March 1914), 75-76. 
35 These strategies were to be found throughout business; see Knox, “Blood on the 
Tracks,” 15; Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade, 112, 123; Sandra Dawson, Paul 
Willman, Alan Clinton, and Martin Bamford, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-
Regulation (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), 4; Arthur McIvor, “Work and Health, 1880-
1914: A Note on a Neglected Interaction,” Scottish Labour History Society 
Journal 24 (1989): 47-67, at 62. 
36 For example, through in-house journals, the trade press, and direct 
communications with the Board of Trade. 
37 GWRM (Jan. 1905), 12. 
38 This pressure was seen in 1905, when the Board of Trade was compelled to 
question the railway companies over discrepancies between the figures that 
companies had returned, as required by law since 1871, relating to employee 
casualties.  TNA: PRO RAIL 1098/53, RCA meeting no. 466, minute 3030, 7 Dec. 
1905.  Knox shows that the companies pursued this approach in 1899 with 
reference to the Royal Commission and the proposed legislation.  Knox, “Blood 
on the Tracks,” 18.  Alborn observes the same response in relation to the issue of 
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interests of safety would have been better served had [our] appliance been 
prescribed for general adoption.”39 
There were two imperatives underlying these interactions with the 
state.  The first of these was the desire to retain company autonomy over 
the work environment.40  In this, the companies had some success.  The 
second imperative related to the financial impact of safety measures.  
Throughout this period the railway companies’ financial position remained 
unstable, with dividends to maintain and expenses mounting.41  Hence, 
the companies’ efforts consistently steered the state away from expensive 
technologies.42  The companies made distinct choices about how to 
address safety, choices ensuring that danger in the workplace was not fully 
eliminated. 
Responses to state intervention were not simply negative.  The 
companies’ attempted to retain control of workplace safety through the 
introduction of the “Safety Movement” educative campaign in 1913, 
designed to show employees “safe” and “unsafe” work practices.  It 
followed in the wake of the American “Safety First” campaign, which, 
                                                                                                                                           
railway rates after the 1880s, and the authority of the company to judge “correct” 
or “fair” rates.  See Alborn, Conceiving Companies, 234-37. 
39 GWRM (Dec. 1911), 330.  This attempt to preserve the companies’ claims on 
“knowledge” relating to safety was recognized by Sub-Inspector Amos Ford of the 
Railway Department, who observed that “Some companies think they know best, 
and do not want any teaching.”  See Royal Commission on the Causes of 
Accidents, Fatal and Non-Fatal, to Servants of Railway Companies and of Truck 
Owners, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, (Cd. 42, London, 1900), Q. 2129. 
40 Across business as a whole, McIvor observes that “whilst undoubtedly 
legislation provided a significant matrix of protection . . . its impact before World 
War One should not be exaggerated.”  In McIvor, “Work and Health,” 64.  This 
was partially a result of opposition to state intervention from companies. 
41 Alborn, Conceiving Companies, 244-45; Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 9, 14. 
These reasons were certainly well worn: for example, Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 4th ser., vol. 170 (6 March 1907), columns 887-88; 
Railway Review (8 Dec. 1911), 2-3. 
42 One possible explanation of the disinclination to pursue expensive 
technological fixes to the safety problems relates to the state’s capping of rates 
and charges between 1894 and 1913, and the generally poor financial situation of 
the companies.  A further related (and highly significant) factor in the opposition 
to the installation of automatic couplings lay in the nature of the British railway 
industry and the use of rolling stock owned by private concerns rather than by the 
railway companies.  Collieries owned large fleets of wagons and hence faced the 
(potentially huge) cost of introducing automatic couplings; they were reluctant to 
spend this money and opposed automatic couplings vigorously.  The companies 
could not compel the collieries to make the changes, and as automatic couplings 
were conceived as an “all or nothing” solution, the non-compliance of a 
substantial proportion of the total fleet of wagons ensured that automatic 
couplings were not introduced.  Clearly, employee safety issues extended beyond 
the understanding of only state-railway company interactions. 
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according to Mark Aldrich, ensured that workers “had far less freedom to 
determine their own work practices.”43  Pertinently, Steven Usselman has 
noted that “searching for remedies to the pressing problems and 
responding to renewed pressure from government for improved safety, 
lines reluctantly found themselves considering radical new departures.”44  
The same was true in Britain, where the “Safety Movement” marked the 
culmination of the attack on state knowledge of employee safety.  It was a 
“radical new departure,” using a variety of techniques, including magazine 
articles, booklets, competitions, and films.  The written material was 
extremely informal in tone and heavily dependent upon photographs; it 
attempted to make the messages easily understood and accessible.  This 
was a highly visual and highly visible alternative to the safety regimes 
suggested by those external to the railway companies. 
The “Safety Movement” did not require any expensive technology or 
changes to the established procedures.45  In fact, its great advantage was 
that it permitted the retention of those procedures, complete with the 
danger that would have been so expensive to remove.  Yet, it was very 
obvious that the companies were addressing the safety problem.  At the 
1914 investigation into employee safety, the most senior state official 
responsible for railway safety observed: 
. . . the railway companies are making tremendous efforts to make 
the men more careful.  [In the monthly article] they very often 
make a picture showing exactly how the man was working when 
the accident occurred, and another picture showing how he ought 
to have been working.46 
This educative approach can be seen to have hit its mark.  Timothy 
Alborn argues that in the nineteenth century the companies repeatedly 
redefined their characters and purposes to avoid state intervention.47  
Similarly, the railway companies used the “Safety Movement” to redefine 
the ways in which employee safety was to be addressed, thereby deflecting 
                                                   
43 Aldrich, Safety First, 7. 
44 Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 11.  Although Usselman considers 
“hard” technologies and, in this instance, passenger safety, his comments are 
applicable to the British experience and the use of the “soft” technology of the 
educative campaign. 
45 Usselman notes of American railroad’s introduction of technologies: “In 
choosing to emphasize certain lines of innovation, railroads in effect sought out 
those paths that appeared least likely to cause disruptions.”  See Usselman, 
Regulating Railroad Innovation, 7 and 274, 287; Aldrich, Safety First, 39. 
46 TNA: PRO RAIL 1124/175, Departmental Committee, Q. 317, testimony of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pelham von Donop. 
47 Alborn, Conceiving Companies, especially 5, 174, 177, 201-2, 225-56.  
Usselman makes broadly similar arguments regarding the ways in which rhetoric 
deployed during the nineteenth century trapped American railroad companies of 
the early twentieth century as they attempted to evade external intervention.  
Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, especially 332, 339. 
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unwanted attention.48  It appeared that the companies had the means by 
which to reduce casualty rates. 
Given how the railway companies contested external intervention 
between 1900 and 1914, it is necessary to consider why the state appeared 
to lose interest in employee safety after 1914.  The answer in part lies in 
broader political and economic factors.  The railway industry was subject 
to extensive organizational upheaval after 1914.  As a result of the war, the 
state took control of the railways between 1914 and 1921.  Between 1921 
and 1923, they amalgamated 123 companies into four massive groupings.49  
In December 1918, a Railway Department memo noted, “Both the Board of 
Trade and the Companies and also the Unions are and will be busy over 
other matters relating to the Railways.”  The consequence was cancellation 
of explicit consideration of employee safety.50  During the 1920s and 
1930s, the railway industry experienced a period of prolonged economic 
retrenchment, driven by national economic conditions and the disastrous 
competition with road transport.51  As a result, railway employee safety 
was not of immediate concern to the state, the companies, or the unions.52  
It was noted in one railway newspaper that “Safety seems to sink into a 
secondary position when the more burning questions of wages, hours and 
other conditions of service are on the same agenda.”53  Thus, employee 
                                                   
48 Aldrich notes of the American educative campaign: “the safety movement 
provided the carriers with a shield to fend off increasingly expensive and 
intrusive government regulations.”  See Aldrich, Safety First, 190. 
49 On the merger and its effects on one company, see Geoffrey Channon, “The 
Great Western Railway under the British Railways Act of 1921,” Business History 
Review 55 (Summer 1981): 188-216. 
50 TNA: PRO RAIL MT 45/8, file relating to the RESAC, memorandum from Sir 
William Marwood to the president of the Board of Trade, 19 Dec. 1918. 
51 On the unclear link between economic performance and safety, see Knox, 
“Blood on the Tracks,” 14.  Although his comments refer to the period before 
1914, they are indicative of changes occurring after 1914.  On the implications 
across wider industry and industrial relations, see McIvor, “Industrial Relations 
in Britain,” esp. 325.  For a brief introduction to all of these factors, see Gerald 
Crompton, “Railway Nationalisation in the U.K.,” in Institutions in the Transport 
and Communications Industries, ed. Andersson-Skog and Krantz, 133-38; 
Alborn, Conceiving Companies, 252-56; Gerald Crompton, “‘Efficient and 
Economical Working’?  The Performance of the Railway Companies, 1923-33,” 
Business History 27 (July 1985): 222-37. 
52 This is not to suggest that safety was of no concern, just that other concerns 
appeared more pressing.  See Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 1; McIvor, “State 
Intervention and Work Intensification,” 134-36; Graham Wilson, The Politics of 
Safety and Health: Occupational Safety and Health in the US and Britain 
(Oxford, U.K., 1985), 114; Jones, “The Home Office,” 278; McIvor, “Work and 
Health,” 59. 
53 “Can Accidents to Railway Employees be Reduced?  (III.),” Railway Gazette 
(26 Aug. 1927), 253.  This is borne out by the evidence found within the minutes 
of meetings between the unions and the companies to discuss matters such as 
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safety was given a relatively low priority by those responsible for 
determining policy, whether state, union, or company.54 
We can also explain the lack of new state-sponsored measures in terms 
of the acceptance of the “Safety Movement.”55  With the First World War, 
the companies, left with the initiative on employee safety, continued the 
educative campaign.  Thus by 1919, when the state might have had the 
time or desire to resume its interest in the safety question, the companies 
had been directing the response to employee safety for nearly six years.  
Consequently, their position was deeply entrenched.56  Moreover, the 
“Safety Movement” appeared to offer a viable solution.  The campaign 
rhetoric consistently made claims for its success.  In 1919, one company 
claimed: “There is no question about it—a large number of accidents were 
prevented.  Year after year the records showed that casualties were 
                                                                                                                                           
safety, wages, and conditions.  Virtually all of the discussion related to wages and 
conditions; safety featured as a tangential concern, often connected with the 
payment of danger money.  See TNA: PRO RAIL 1026/34, Minutes of Meetings 
between the Railway Companies and the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), 
Nov. 1920-Dec. 1926; TNA: PRO RAIL 1026/29, Minutes of Meetings between 
the Railway Companies and the NUR, 1931-52.  There is also evidence that the 
tendency to concentrate upon wages and hours was (publicly) observed before 
1914; see Punch (20 Dec. 1911), 449, for a satirical graph representation. 
54 This is comprehensible as the outcome of a rational decision-making process 
(upon which model the “Safety Movement” and idea of the educative campaign 
was predicated).  The worker had only a chance of incurring injury; loss of wages 
(to the employee, if they did not work in unsafe conditions) or loss of capital (to 
the employer, investing in expensive safety measures) definitely affected the 
relevant party.  The rationality of “risky behaviour” is considered in literature 
addressing why people might act in ways that are dangerous: see Catherine Jane 
Mills, “Statutory Safety and Health Provision in the British Mining Industry, with 
Particular Reference to Non-Ferrous Metals, 1800-1914” (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Exeter, 2003), 303; Dawson et al., Safety at Work, 23-24, 241; Dorothy Nelkin 
and Michael Brown, “Observations on Workers’ Perceptions of Risk in the 
Dangerous Trades,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 9 (Spring 1984): 3-
10; Matthew Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, 1800-2000 
(Manchester, U.K., 2000), especially 185, 192, 195, 204, 225, 227, 230-31, 254.  
This is not to deny the role of official negotiation at the shopfloor level, or the 
possibility of unofficial negotiation between workers and supervisors, which may 
explain why safety makes little appearance in the preserved record.  For example, 
see Michael Bloor, “No Longer Dying for a Living: Collective Responses to Injury 
Risks in South Wales Mining Communities, 1900-47,” Sociology 36 (Feb. 2002): 
89-105. 
55 Existing inspection and inquiry duties continued. 
56 It also fitted in with ideas that were emerging regarding the “human factor” in 
casualty causation; ideas endorsed at the state level through the work of bodies 
such as the Health of Munitions Workers Committee and Industrial Fatigue 
Research Board. 
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decreasing.”57  Such claims must be viewed as a means of legitimating the 
educative campaign.  If the voluntary approach could be shown to be 
working, and the companies tackling the problem, state intervention was 
unnecessary.58  In selecting the “Safety Movement” over technological 
solutions, the companies made a deliberate choice as to how “safety” was 
to be constructed, presented, and addressed.59  Other approaches were 
disavowed: “Two courses present themselves in connection with the 
prevention of accidents: one is to educate men in safe methods of doing 
their work, and the other is to trust to their own natural instincts of self-
preservation.” No mention was made of technological or legislative 
solutions.60  The companies thus presented the state with their method of 
improving safety; not only did the “Safety Movement” work, but there 
were no other options. 
This rhetoric persuaded the Ministry of Transport, which even 
promoted the use of the educative campaign.  For example, in 1922 the 
Ministry claimed that “Improvement [in casualties] can only be obtained 
by educating the men in personal carefulness.  This is being done in many 
instances by means of Safety propaganda, and the general education of the 
staff by this means is highly desirable.”61  This approach ensured that the 
state did not have to take a more active role—significant given the other 
pressing concerns of the 1920s and 1930s.62  Thus, control of the messages 
of the “Safety Movement”—and of railway employee safety—was left in the 
hands of the companies after 1914. 
Company control of employee safety necessitates discussion of 
“regulatory capture”—the idea that regulatory agencies can be dominated 
                                                   
57 GWRM (April 1919), 59. 
For other examples, see GWRM: (June 1921), 130; (March 1926), 86; (Oct. 1926), 
341. 
58 The approach was not entirely without its critics:  “As we have seen, all these 
means have failed to stop aggregate increases year by year in the number of 
accidents. . . . Yet still the cry is for more propaganda.”  Nevertheless, the 
(anonymous) author of this piece remained a lone, and uninfluential, voice.  
Railway Gazette (26 Aug.1927), 253. 
59 See Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, 287, for the American 
equivalent. 
60 GWRM (Jan. 1926), 4.  That this view was adopted by the state is seen in the 
analysis of the work of the RESAC (looking into technological solutions) after 
nearly ten years: “If it is no longer in evidence, that is due, in part . . . to the 
spread of the Safety First movement.”  Railway Gazette (27 March 1925), 429. 
61 Report to the Ministry of Transport upon the Accidents that have occurred on 
the Railways of the Great Britain and Ireland for the Year 1921 (London, 1922), 
12.  Such statements were to be found each year in the Ministry of Transport’s 
reports, and demonstrate the State’s acceptance of the educative model. 
62 We see state acceptance of the voluntarist “Safety First” campaign in the 
promotion of the educative technique during the interwar period, particularly in 
relation to factories and manufacturing.  See Jones, “The Home Office,” 260-78. 
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by those they were supposed to supervise.63  Terry Gourvish notes: “It 
would be stretching things too far to [suggest] . . . that railway companies 
‘captured’ the institutions which sought to regulate them.”64  I would 
agree, although the very similar outlook between the companies and the 
Railway Department influenced state policy on employee safety.  The 
shared view had existed since the start of state regulation of the railways.65  
The Railway Department and company officials thought in similar ways; 
David Howell has observed: “senior civil servants and senior railway 
figures spoke the same language and shared standards of 
reasonableness.”66  Thus, upon retirement from the Railway Department 
in 1913, the Chief Inspecting Officer was appointed a director of one of the 
companies.67 Similarly, in 1931 the industry understood that state 
inspectors were “reasonable in their views and recognise that [additional 
appliances] may not be justified under the conditions [at present].”68 
                                                   
63 Wilson, The Politics of Safety and Health, 21; Braithwaite, To Punish or 
Persuade, 133. 
64 Gourvish, “Regulation of Britain’s Railways,” 120. 
65 On the nineteenth-century origins of the Railway Department and the links 
with the railway companies, see Parris, Government and Railways, 37; 
Alderman, The Railway Interest, 46, 66.  On the general point, see Dawson et al., 
Safety at Work, 208-12. 
66 David Howell, “Railway Safety and Labour Unrest: The Aisgill Railway Disaster 
of 1913,” in On the Move: Essays in Labour and Transport History Presented to 
Philip Bagwell, ed. Chris Wrigley and John Shepherd (London, 1991), 123-54, 
quotation at 154.  Of relevance is Miliband: “If members of the ruling class and 
the state are drawn from the same social groups in society, are subject to the 
same socialisation and educational process . . . then they are likely to share the 
same fundamental assumptions and interests and, in a crisis particularly, they 
are likely to behave in ways which tend to preserve their common interests.”  
Ralph Miliband, quoted in James Roy Hay, “Employers’ Attitudes to Social Policy 
and the Concept of ‘Social Control,’” in The Origins of British Social Policy, ed. 
Pat Thane (London, 1978), 112.  Similarly, in 1905 the GWR observed that 
“relations between the Board of Trade and the companies are usually of a very 
cordial character, and the iron hand of power is exercised through a velvet glove.”  
GWRM (Jan. 1905), 12. 
67 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur Yorke, Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways 
1900-13; joined the Board of Directors of the GWR in 1914.  According to 
Bernstein, “Various social opportunities may be open to commissioners who are 
or may become sympathetic to the position of the regulated groups.  The chance 
to secure an executive post with a firm subject to regulation may urge a certain 
kind of restraint upon commissioners.”  See Bernstein, Regulating Business, 83. 
68 Railway Gazette (13 March 1931), 390-91; see also Railway Gazette (16 June 
1922), 955.  Channon notes that the railway company general managers were 
“increasingly familiar with official [State] committees, rules and regulations; 
[during the First World War] they were in permanent contact with the machinery 
of government, if not part of it.  Indeed, in important respects they acted . . . as 
the Board of Trade’s agents.”  Channon, “The Great Western Railway,” 194. 
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We find further demonstration of the parity of view between state and 
company in their understandings of the causes of casualties.  The state 
could not investigate the cause of every employee casualty—there were far 
too many—but it trusted the analyses provided by the companies.  
Between 1900 and 1939, the companies’ statistics “showed” that employee 
“carelessness” caused over 95 percent of casualties.  The state investigators 
largely agreed, concluding that approximately 90 percent of casualties 
were caused by employees.69  We see similarities between the state and 
companies’ understanding of “safety” and causation; yet, Theo Nichols has 
observed, “if men make accidents they do not do so under conditions of 
their own choosing.”70  The focus upon the carelessness of the worker 
obscured the system as a causative factor—a system that routinely put 
employees in dangerous situations, such as work in among moving 
trains.71  Neither state nor company questioned that the system should 
                                                   
69 General Report to the Board of Trade upon the Accidents that have occurred 
on the Railways of the United Kingdom (London) for the years 1913-19; Report 
to the Ministry of Transport (London) for the years 1920-38.  Statistics come 
from tables of casualties inquired into by the state; causes attributable to 
employees defined as parts A-C (following the state’s division into these 
categories).  The idea of employee “carelessness” was originally invoked in the 
nineteenth century (in relation to the railway industry), and persisted at least into 
the 1980s in Britain: in 1984 it was observed (by the state) that “Dangerous 
situations result all too frequently from the indifference bred by familiarity.”  
Major Charles Rose, Report to the Secretary of State for Transport and the 
Health and Safety Commission on the Safety Record of the Railways in Great 
Britain during 1984 (London, 1985), vi.  We find a similar notion of employee 
“carelessness” in the American campaign.  See Aldrich, Safety First, 115. 
70 Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury (London, 1997), 117.  The 
brief reports of the few employee casualties investigated exemplify this attitude.  
For example, of an employee run down by a train, the conclusion read: “The 
accident was due to Miller failing to keep a good look-out, and commencing to 
work apart from [his co-worker] Eggaford while he was working in a place where 
danger was likely to arise.”  That he was working in a place where danger was 
likely to arise was not the problem, in this understanding of safety; it was the 
employee’s failure to look after himself where he should have displayed caution.  
William Worthy Cooke, Summary of Accidents and Casualties reported to the 
Ministry of Transport During the Three Months ending 31 December 1927, 
“Appendix C: Reports by the Sub-Inspecting Officers of Railways on Accidents to 
Railway Servants and Other Persons Employed on Railway Premises” (London, 
1928), 41. 
71 That this is not a projection of an anachronistic (late twentieth-century) 
understanding of casualty causation is demonstrated by David Howell’s 
discussion of the causes of the Aisgill passenger crash of 1913, in which the NUR’s 
Jimmy Thomas (among others) argued contemporaneously that the incident was 
due to the Midland Railway’s policy decisions rather than to the engine driver.  
Howell, “Railway Safety and Labour Unrest,” 123-54, especially 138-40.  
Similarly, the 1877 Royal Commission received a memorial from various 
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operate in this way; the “Safety Movement” reinforced this apparently 
“natural” system, and addressed only the employee’s role in casualty 
prevention. 
This understanding among state and companies concerning the causes 
of casualties was consistent throughout the period.  It is therefore 
understandable why the state was so willing to leave safety in the hands of 
the companies after 1914.  As Marver Bernstein notes: 
. . . this is not to suggest that there is a conspiracy between the 
regulated and the regulator but rather a more subtle relationship 
in which the mores, attitudes, and thinking of those regulated 
come to prevail in the approach and thinking of many 
commissioners.72 
Thus, it could be that the state was susceptible to the claims of voluntarism 
and cooperation on the part of the companies, and to the messages and 
solutions offered by the “Safety Movement.”73 
In this paper, I have explored some of the ways in which the state and 
business interacted to produce occupational safety on Britain’s railways 
between 1900 and 1939.  I suggest that we can explain state action—or 
inaction—through the companies’ attempts to minimize state intervention.  
This was achieved through devaluation of state knowledge, seeming co-
operation with the state, and the voluntary approach of the “Safety 
Movement.”  There was also considerable similarity in outlook between 
state and company, particularly over the causes of casualties. 
The close relationship between state and industry still exists, 
epitomized in the statement of a former British Rail Safety Officer 
interviewed for the National Archive of Railway Oral History.  He recalled 
that following casualties in the 1980s, state inspectors made 
recommendations and together had discussions 
                                                                                                                                           
(manual) grades of railway employees that took issue with the companies’ 
classification of those casualty causes that found the employee responsible.  The 
memorial instead offered a series of potential causes in which the system was at 
fault (such as excessive hours of labor or insufficient numbers of staff employed).  
Report from the Commissioners on Railway Accidents, Appendix G: “Memorial 
to the Royal Commission on Railway Accidents from Inspectors, Engine-Drivers, 
and Firemen, Guards, Shunters, Pointsmen, Porters, and Platelayers employed 
on British Railways” (1877), 122. 
72 Bernstein, Regulating Business, 83. 
73 Contemporary observers noticed this similarity of outlook.  One union claimed 
that “the strings of the Railway Department . . . are pulled by the officials of the 
railway companies.”  Railway Review (24 Feb. 1911), 15.  See also: Railway 
Review (7 March 1913), 1.  Another author was critical of what he called 
“collusion” between the state and the companies, and of the “ ‘friendly’ deal 
between the great companies and the Board of Trade.”  Rowland Kenney, Men 
and Rails (London, 1913), 124-25, 128, 230; see also 111, 121-23.  Although the 
evidence for such an explicit link is dubious, it is significant that the state was 
perceived in this way. 
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. . . to fine tune them, not with the intention of trying to be 
negative at all, or obstructive . . . but just so that the 
recommendations that they’d made were ones that we felt [British 
Rail] could accept happily and that we thought were practical and 
realistic.74 
                                                   
74 NRM, National Archive of Railway Oral History, 2002-143 (interviewee name 
withheld), tape 10, side B. 
